of special gravity face the lawyer who serves as advisor or draftsman to a constitutional convention or a legislative body. The consequences of his advice, if it is taken, will reverberate large and long; and in the perform?
But despite the formal identity of the client as the whole acting on behalf of the whole, on fundamental questions pertaining to the whole, the formal language that designates a gathering as a "constitutional convention"
or a "committee on code revision" does not charm away the tough, hard facts of difference and confusion over the ends to be sought or the means to be em?
ployed. There is no drug capable of inducing a trance state in the seasoned politician (or the unseasoned citizen, for that matter), by which he becomes a dispassionate spokesman for the common good. Even when the individual does his conscious best to discover and define the common good he is hampered by It is assumed in modern society that the professional man differs from the nonprofessional in his awareness of, competence in, and service to the common good. In every professional relation the lawyer is supposed to function in some degree as an agent of the whole body politic, and modern society implements this special function by making the lawyer an officer of the court and imposing upon him standards of skill and integrity. When the legal counselor represents a private client it is understood that he is not stepping outside the bounds of community policy, since the public policy is to provide private parties with access to judicial tribunals and expert advice. But concern for the public wel? fare prohibits certain methods (jury tampering, for instance) by which overzealous advocates may be tempted to advance the ciaims of particular clients.
And on the other hand there is public concern for protecting the client against his legal counselor, so that the lawyer is forbidden to exploit information ob?
tained in his professional capacity for private gain. The whole system of judi? cial procedure is part of the institutional setup designed for the task of putting our fundamental concern for the dignity of the individual into the working relations of everyday life. Even when a professional man represents the gov? ernment in litigation with a private party, the official connection does not entitle counsel to special privileges against the opposing advocate. (1946). 3. We are, of course, conversant with the tactical advantages to be derived by mem? bers of the legal profession in many cases when they publicly disclaim any influence upon clients. Many clients look upon the attorney as an agent; and they are not averse to acknowledging or even magnifying the degree in which their minds are autonomous, hence insusceptible to guidance. If a lawyer intends to manipulate tyrants or democratic officials or private clients he will find it a sound strategem to pretend not to. It has sometimes been intimated that this is one of the reasons for the reluctance in many quarters to make explicit the policy significance of the legal and political process. See Burnham, The Machiavellians blies, it is necessary to weigh the importance of individuals and of viewpoints 4. In our present analysis of public order under law we associate ourselves with the overriding goals of human dignity. We leave to one side any consideration of how to advise tyrants or autocrats. We omit these matters not because they fall outside the province of jurisprudence, but because we have our hands full with the problems of implementing the values of societies that aspire toward freedom. We are concentrating on the public order of a free society. What we say is addressed to the members of the profession who are willing to accept these values; and who are also willing to give them institutional implementation when occasion arises. These occasions are limited to situations in which the lawyer is able to act on behalf of responsible authorities who are agreed upon the ideology of freedom, or who comprise a majority in support of this perspective. We exclude the problem of "boring from within" an anti-democratic regime for the purpose of bringing about conditions favorable to a democratic revolution. In a word, we leave to one side situations calling for subterfuge on the part of a legal advisor who is genuinely identified with the goal values of a free society.
Every lawyer knows that, whether he likes it or not, he influences
5 8. In the formulation of a corrective code there is an assumption that full compliance with the requirements of the legal system is unlikely; and that while some deviations may be ignored or else dealt with by regulatory measures, a considerable residue of noncompliance will remain.
In some of the other sorts of codes?such as the regulatory, see pp. 190-91 infra?even full consent to and compliance with published prescriptions would not necessarily guarantee the accomplishment of the ends sought to be achieved. tions are expressed will increase the probability that the events sought will occur (and diminish the likelihood that undesired events will take place). 14. When we use the term "empowered" we have both dimensions of a decision irt mind: authority and control. Besides having a formally correct authorization the constitu? tional convention (or other body) is expected to exercise effective power. This does not mean that the recommendations or the enactments of the body in question will be adopted or put into effect at once; on the contrary, they may be rejected in whole or in part. When we speak of "effective" as well as "formal" power, we are not referring to total success or failure to match conformity with prescription, but rather intend to indicate that the organ, if a recommending agency, is taken seriously; and that it achieves a considerable degree 
(4)
Inventing new alternatives of policy and estimating the probable outcome of all alternatives for the optimal attainment of preferred goals.
The four points in this analysis, it will be noted, restate the relationship be?
tween a professional counselor and his client, discussed above.
Codes Comprising the System of Public Order
In examining the distinctive problems that arise in the making of a legal code, it is useful to have an explicit conception of how such a code is linked with the system of public order as a whole. We propose to define the system Control 151-63 (rev. ed. 1950). 18. We do not employ the terms "law" or "legal" in reference to a pattern of words divorced from deeds. Jurisprudence is not properly a branch of lexicography. Rather, the living fact is that law is a structure of institutional practices at once verbal and overt. When we estimate the future of a given form of authoritative language, we consider the likelihood of its being protected against challenge to a degree entitling it to be regarded as a presumptive practice of the commonwealth. A formal prescription must have been backed by effective control in the past, and have a high probability of being so sustained in the future, before we speak of it as part of law. A major question pertinent to the classification of prescriptions is whether the acts they refer to affect the preferred patterns of community life, or whether the "structural" pattern is left intact, so that the acts have "operational" signi? ficance only. There is evidence from our own legal system, and from others, that when the social structure is assumed to be at stake the requirements of The executory code, finally, prescribes who acts how in formulating and putting prescriptions into effect.
We summarize in Table I 
